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Hierarchical Polar Coding for Achieving
Secrecy over Fading Wiretap Channels without
any Instantaneous CSI
Hongbo Si, O. Ozan Koyluoglu, and Sriram Vishwanath
Abstract
This paper presents a polar coding scheme to achieve secrecy in block fading binary symmetric
wiretap channels without the knowledge of instantaneous channel state information (CSI) at the trans-
mitter. For this model, a coding scheme that hierarchically utilizes polar codes is presented. In particular,
on polarization of different binary symmetric channels over different fading blocks, each channel use is
modeled as an appropriate binary erasure channel over fading blocks. Polar codes are constructed for
both coding over channel uses for each fading block and coding over fading blocks for certain channel
uses. In order to guarantee security, random bits are introduced at appropriate places to exhaust the
observations of the eavesdropper. It is shown that this coding scheme, without instantaneous CSI at
the transmitter, is secrecy capacity achieving for the simultaneous fading scenario. For the independent
fading case, the capacity is achieved when the fading realizations for the eavesdropper channel is always
degraded with respect to the receiver. For the remaining cases, the gap is analyzed by comparing lower
and upper bounds. Remarkably, for the scenarios where the secrecy capacity is achieved, the results
imply that instantaneous CSI does not increase the secrecy capacity.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Wiretap channels, introduced in the seminal paper of Wyner [1], model the communication
between a transmitter and a receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper that overhears the
transmitted signals via the channel between transmitter and eavesdropper (e.g., by tapping the
wire between the legitimate nodes). The task of transmitter is to hide information from the
eavesdropper while communicating reliably to the receiver. Wyner studied this problem and
characterized the capacity region for certain channel models including the case of degraded
eavesdropper [1]. The achievability technique is the randomized version of the Shannon’s random
coding approach, where the randomization is utilized to confuse the eavesdropper, in order to
achieve security. Since the publication of Wyner’s work, several studies in the network informa-
tion theory domain have utilized this random coding approach to characterize the corresponding
secrecy capacities. Yet, the design of secrecy achieving coding schemes with practical constraints
such as low complexity and availability of channel state information remains as an important
direction in the physical layer security.
Recently, polar codes have been utilized for communication over degraded wiretap channels
[2]–[5]. Polar codes are the first family of provably capacity achieving codes for symmetric
binary-input discrete memoryless channels with low encoding and decoding complexity [6].
These codes rely on the “channel polarization” technique, which reconstructs a set of equivalent
channels such that each of them is either purely noisy or noiseless. Noting that the fraction of
noiseless channels approaches the symmetric channel capacity, transmitting information symbols
on the good instances and freezing the bad ones achieves the optimal rate. The schemes proposed
in [2]–[5] are based on the behavior of the polarization of degraded channels, where the polarized
channels for the degraded wiretap channels can be partitioned to one of the following sets: (i)
good for both receiver and eavesdropper, (ii) good for receiver and bad for eavesdropper, and
(iii) bad for both receiver and eavesdropper. The fraction of type (ii) channels approach to the
secrecy capacity for the degraded (binary symmetric) wiretap channels, and the communication
scheme utilizes this type of polarized indices to transmit information; whereas, type (i) channels
are assigned to random bits to limit the eavesdropper’s ability to obtain information about the
messages. (Type (iii) channels are frozen, i.e., set to a constant value and shared to receiver.) This
3scheme allows for achieving the secrecy capacity, while inheriting the low complexity nature
of polar codes. In other words, this technique mimics the Wyner’s random coding approach
with practical encoding/decoding schemes. The main hurdle for most practical applications
though is to have the eavesdropper channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter, e.g., in
order to differentiate between type (i) and (ii) channels in this coding scheme. Remarkably, an
incorrect knowledge about the eavesdropper CSI would leak information, hence will not result
in a meaningful security guarantee. In this work, we focus on relaxing the assumption on the
instantaneous CSI knowledge, and develop polar coding schemes for fading wiretap channels,
where only the statistics of CSI (of both receiver and eavesdropper) is known at the transmitter.
B. Contributions
The contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows:
• We first focus on a simultaneous fading model, where both main and eavesdropper channels
experience the same fading states. A good exemplar for this scenario, perhaps, is physically
degraded channels, where the eavesdropper observes the output of the main channel through
an additional noisy channel (e.g., through wiretapping). In these models, when only the
main channel experiences fading, the resulting system reduces to our simultaneous fading
model. Here, we divide our analysis with respect to different orderings between the channel
qualities seen by receiver and eavesdropper. Focusing on each case separately, we propose
achievable secrecy rates based on hierarchical polar coding. This technique exploits multiple
polar codes, which are utilized over channel uses for each block as well as over fading blocks
for certain polarized channel indices.
• We next focus on the optimality of the proposed scheme by comparing the resulting rate
with an upper bound on secrecy capacity of the simultaneous fading model. The upper
bound is obtained by allowing the transmitter to know instantaneous CSI, and remarkably,
this bound is shown to be matching to the secrecy rates attained by the proposed achievable
scheme, therefore characterizing the secrecy capacity of the system. It is remarkable that
instantaneous CSI does not improve secrecy capacity for this model, and having only the
statistical CSI suffices. (We note that our proposed coding scheme based on polar codes is
instrumental in obtaining this result, as, to the best of our knowledge, there are no random
coding strategies achieving a similar performance.)
4• Thirdly, we focus on a general model, where both main and eavesdropper channels have
independent fading but at every fading block main channel has a stronger channel realization
than the eavesdropper. In this case, a modified version of the aforementioned coding scheme
is shown to achieve secrecy capacity.
• Finally, we focus on the case of independent fading where eavesdropper’s channel realization
can be stronger than the main channel at a given block, but main channel is stronger on
the average. In this scenario, we proposed an appropriate coding scheme, again based on
hierarchical polar coding, and compare its performance with an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity, which is obtained with instantaneous CSI assumption. We analyze the gap between
the achievable rate and the outer bound, and investigate the role of instantaneous CSI in
increasing secrecy rates for this model.
Overall, the proposed hierarchical polar coding scheme is a key component to achieve these
results. This technique utilizes the polarization phenomena to convert the randomness in fading
realizations (for both main and eavesdropper channels) to erasure channels over which additional
polarization layer is used. Based on such a decomposition and injecting random symbols in
appropriate positions (to achieve security over fading blocks), we establish a coding scheme that
can secure messages without the need of any instantaneous CSI. (Detailed description of this
technique is given later in the sequel.)
C. Related Work
In addition to [2]–[5], recent studies on the design of polar coding schemes to achieve
secrecy include [7]–[14], where strong security is considered in [3], [8], [11], [13], key agree-
ment/generation is studied in [3], [9], [10], and other channel models (different than discrete
memoryless wiretap channel) are considered in [4], [12], [14]. Our model is similar to the
fading models considered in [3], [14], but differentiates from all these prior studies in that only
a statistical (i.e., distribution) CSI for both receiver and eavesdropper channels is assumed at the
transmitter. Polar coding schemes for fading wiretap channels are first studied in [3], where the
transmitter has the knowledge of instantaneous CSI for the receiver’s channel and statistical CSI
for the eavesdropper’s channel. With this setup, a key agreement scheme is proposed based on
utilizing polar codes for each fading block, where the communicated bits over fading blocks are
then used in a privacy amplification step to construct secret keys. This technique when combined
5with invertible extractors allows for secure message transmission but with the requirement of
receiver CSI at the transmitter [3]. Recent work [14] proposes a polar coding scheme that utilizes
artificial noise and multiple transmit antennas under the same assumption (instantaneous CSI for
receiver and statistical CSI for eavesdropper) for the fading channels. However, a guarantee
of secrecy rate with some probability (not the corresponding channel capacity) is achieved. In
contrast, in this paper, we consider a fading channel model where the transmitter does not need to
know any instantaneous CSI, but only its distribution for both receiver and eavesdropper channels.
The hierarchical polar coding scheme proposed in this paper, to the best of our knowledge, is the
first provably secrecy capacity achieving coding scheme for fading (binary symmetric) wiretap
channels. Considering that this type of binary channels model the AWGN channels with BPSK
modulation and demodulation, our scheme covers a wide application scenarios in practice.
D. Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents a brief introduction to polar
coding scheme. Section III focuses on the simultaneous fading model, where the achievable
coding scheme based on hierarchical polar coding is developed and the secrecy capacity is
characterized. Section IV investigates the independent fading model, where modified coding
schemes are developed specific to this model and the gap to capacity is analyzed via the difference
between upper and lower bounds. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. INTRODUCTION TO POLAR CODING
Before moving to the main body of this paper, we first introduce the preliminary for polar
coding. The construction of polar code is based on a phenomenon referred to as channel
polarization. Consider a binary-input discrete memoryless channel WB-DMC : X → Y , where
X = {0, 1}. Define
F =

 1 0
1 1

 .
Let BN be the bit-reversal operator as defined in [6], where N is a power of 2. By applying
the transform GN = BNF⊗ logN (F⊗ logN denotes the logN th Kronecker product of F ) to
u1:N , the encoded codeword given by x1:N = u1:NGN is transmitted through N independent
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Fig. 1: Illustration of channel polarization for polar codes
copies of WB-DMC. Now, consider N binary-input coordinate channels W(i)N : X → YN × X i−1
(i ∈ {1, . . . , N}), the transition probability is given by
W
(i)
N (y1:N , u1:i−1|ui) ,
∑
ui+1:N
1
2N−1
WNB-DMC(y1:N |u1:NGN ).
Remarkably, as N → ∞, the channels W(i)N polarize to either noiseless or pure-noisy, and the
fraction of noiseless channels is close to I(WB-DMC), the symmetric capacity of channel WB-DMC
[6].
Given this polarization phenomenon (as shown in Fig. 1), polar codes can be considered as
GN -coset codes with parameters (N,K,A, uAc), where uAc ∈ XN−K is frozen vector (can be
set to all-zeros for binary symmetric channels [6]), and the information set A is chosen as a K-
element subset of {1, . . . , N} such that the Bhattacharyya parameters satisfy Z(W(i)N ) ≤ Z(W
(j)
N )
for all i ∈ A and j ∈ Ac, i.e., A denotes the set of indices for good channels (that are noiseless
in the limit). We use permutations (namely, pi and φ in the sequel) to denote the increasing order
of Bhattacharyya parameter values for the polarization of underlying channels. (For instance, for
block length N , pi(1) gives the most reliable polarized channel index, and pi(N) gives the most
unreliable one.)
A decoder for a polar code is the successive cancelation (SC) decoder, which gives an estimate
uˆ1:N of u1:N given knowledge of A, uAc , and y1:N by computing
uˆi ,


1, if i ∈ A, and W
(i)
N
(y1:N ,uˆ1:i−1|0)
W
(i)
N
(y1:N ,uˆ1:i−1|1)
≥ 1,
0, otherwise ,
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in the order i from 1 to N . It has been shown that, by adopting an SC decoder, polar codes
achieve any rate R < I(WB-DMC) with a decoding error scaling as O(2−N
β
), where β < 1/2.
Moreover, the complexity for both encoding and decoding is O(N logN).
III. HIERARCHICAL POLAR CODING FOR SIMULTANEOUS FADING CASE
A. Problem setup
In this section, we investigate the case where main channel and eavesdropper fade simultane-
ously. More precisely, consider the fading (binary symmetric) wiretap channel model (Fig. 2):
Alice wishes to send message to Bob through the main channel W , where the channel experiences
the following block fading phenomenon: with probability q1, channel W is a BSC(p1) (in the
superior state), and with the rest probability q2 , 1 − q1, channel W is a BSC(p2) (in the
degraded state). On the same time, the transmission also reaches to an adversary (Eve) through
the wiretap channel W∗, where W∗ is degraded compared to the main channel, and experiences
the same fading state as the main channel. In particular, when W is a BSC(p1), W∗ is a BSC(p∗1);
when W is a BSC(p2), W∗ is a BSC(p∗2). Under this system model, we have p1 ≤ p2 ≤ 0.5,
p∗1 ≤ p
∗
2 ≤ 0.5, p1 ≤ p
∗
1, and p2 ≤ p∗2.
Remark 1. Simultaneous fading model considers the case where main channel and eavesdropper
channel experience the same fading states (i.e., both are superior or both are degraded), and
eavesdropper channel is assumed to be degraded to the main channel over each fading block.
In Section IV, we consider an independent fading model where the two channels take their
degraded/superior fading states independent of each other. (In this scenario, the eavesdropper
can be stronger than the main channel for a given fading block, but the main channel is assumed
to be stronger on the average.)
8In general, fading coefficients vary at a much slower pace than the transmission symbol
duration. For such cases, block fading model is considered, where the channel state is assumed
to be constant within each coherence time interval, and follows a stationary ergodic process
across fading blocks [15]. To this end, we consider the practical scenario where channel state
information (CSI) is available only at the decoder (CSI-D), while the encoder only knows the
statistics of channel states. Under this model, a secrete message M is encoded by an encoding
function f(·) to generate transmitted symbols: X1:NB = f(M), where N is the length of a fading
block, and B is the number of blocks. At the receiver, a decoding function g(·) gives an estimate
of the estimate Mˆ, i.e., Mˆ = g(Y1:NB). The reliability of transmission is satisfied if
Pe , Pr{M 6= Mˆ|Y1:NB, S} → 0, as N,B →∞ (1)
where S denotes CSI, and (weak) security is defined as achieving
1
NB
I(M;Z1:NB|S)→ 0, as N,B →∞. (2)
We denote the secrecy capacity of this model as CsCSI-D, which represents the highest achievable
secrecy rate satisfying reliability (1) and secrecy (2) constraints.
B. Upper bound to the secrecy capacity
Under the degraded assumption, the secrecy capacity of the wiretap system can be upper
bounded as reported in the following result.
Lemma 2. The secrecy capacity for the simultaneous fading model is upper bounded by
CsCSI-D ≤ q1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)].
Proof: We have
CsCSI-D , max
p(x)
[I(X;Y|S)− I(X;Z|S)]
(a)
≤ max
p(x|s)
[I(X;Y|S)− I(X;Z|S)]
= max
p(x|1)
q1[I(X;Y|S = 1)− I(X;Z|S = 1)]
+ max
p(x|2)
q2[I(X;Y|S = 2)− I(X;Z|S = 2)]
(b)
= q1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)], (3)
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where
(a) follows by upper bounding the secrecy capacity with the case where encoder has CSI and
adapts its coding scheme according to the channel states, i.e., CsCSI-ED [16];
(b) is due to the secrecy capacity result for the degraded binary symmetric wiretap channel
[17].
In this paper, assuming CSI is available only at the receivers, we provide a polar coding scheme
that achieves this upper bound while satisfying reliability (1) and security (2) constraints. To this
end, the upper bound (3) gives the secrecy capacity of our model. For the moment, we assume
p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p
∗
1 ≤ p
∗
2, and the remaining case (p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2) is detailed in Section III-E.
C. Intuition behind the proposed coding scheme
The intuition of hierarchical polar coding scheme originates from the polarization of degraded
channels [18]. When polarizing two binary symmetric channels BSC(p1) and BSC(p2) with
p1 ≤ p2, the good channels (i.e., noiseless as block length tends to infinity) of the polarized
degraded channel BSC(p2) is a subset of that of the superior channel BSC(p1). As illustrated
in Fig. 3, set G contains all good channel indices after permutation for both channels, while
set B contains all bad channel indices after permutation for both channels. [19] utilizes this
property to construct hierarchical polar codes in order to achieve the capacity of fading binary
symmetric channels. More precisely, polar codes are not only designed over channel uses within
each fading block, but also utilized over different fading blocks. Inspired by this design, and
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combined with the polar coding scheme for wiretap channels [2]–[5], we design the proposed
polar coding scheme for fading binary symmetric wiretap channels.
D. The scenario of p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2
Theorem 3. The secrecy capacity for the simultaneous fading model for p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2 is
given by
CsCSI-D = q1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)].
Proof: The upper bound follows from Lemma 2. We detail the coding scheme (ie., a lower
bound) as follows:
Encoder:
The encoder works in two phases (see Fig. 4), hierarchically using polar codes to generate an
NB-length codeword.
Phase I (BEC Encoding):
Here, we consider two sets of messages to be encoded using polar encoders designed for
binary erasure channels (BECs). For the first set of messages, we generate |M1| number of
BEC polar codes, where
|M1| = N [H(p
∗
2)−H(p
∗
1)]. (4)
Consider a set of blockwise messages u(i)1:|Ac| with i ∈ {1, . . . , |M1|}, where A is the information
set for BEC(q2), i.e.,
|A| = B · q1, (5)
|Ac| = B · q2. (6)
For every u(i)1:|Ac|, we combine it with |A| random bits to construct polar codeword u˜
(i)
1:B. Denoting
the permutation for BEC(q2) channel as φ, and the uniform random string as r(i)1:|A| (each bit is
Ber(1/2) distributed), the encoding process is given by
u˜
(i)
1:B = µ
(i)
1:B ×GB,
φ
(
µ
(i)
1:B
)
=
[
r
(i)
1:|A| | u
(i)
1:|Ac|
]
,
11
w
(k)
1:|I|
φ−1
0
transpose
v˜
(j)
1:B
0
U˜
V˜
V˜
T
U˜
TPhase II
BSC Encoding
Phase I
BEC Encoding
φ−1
|Ac|
|Ac||A|
transpose
|M1|
|M2|
|A|
× GB =
× GN = X
× GB =
|I| |F||R| |M1| |M2|
random bits
information bits
frozen bits
pi−1
v
(j)
1:|A|
r
(i)
1:|A| u
(i)
1:|Ac|
u˜
(i)
1:B
s
(k)
1:|R|
Fig. 4: Encoder of the polar coding scheme for fading wiretap channels.
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , |M1|}, where GB is the polar generator matrix with size B. By collecting
all u˜(i)1:B together, the encoder generates a |M1| × B matrix U˜ . We denote U˜Tk as the k-th row
of the transpose of U˜ , where k ∈ {1, . . . , B}.
Secondly, we generate |M2| number of BEC polar codes, where
|M2| = N [H(p2)−H(p1)]. (7)
Consider another set of blockwise messages v(j)1:|A| with j ∈ {1, . . . , |M2|}. Each message is set
as information bits to construct polar codeword v˜(j)1:B. More formally, this encoding process is
given by
v˜
(j)
1:B = ν
(j)
1:B ×GB,
φ
(
ν
(j)
1:B
)
=
[
v
(j)
1:|A| | 0
]
,
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , |M2|}. The collection of all v˜(j)1:B together is denoted as a |M2|×B matrix
V˜ . We denote V˜ Tk as the k-th row of the transpose of V˜ , where k ∈ {1, . . . , B}.
Phase II (BSC Encoding):
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In this phase, we generate B number of BSC polar codes, each with length N . The encoded
codewords from previous phase are embedded as messages of this phase. We consider a set of
messages w(k)1:|I| with k ∈ {1, . . . , B}, where
|I| = N [H(p∗1)−H(p2)]. (8)
For every w(k)1:|I|, we introduce random bits s
(k)
1:|R|, where
|R| = N [1−H(p∗2)], (9)
and combine the output from the previous phase as message to construct polar codeword x(k)1:N .
More formally, if we denote the reordering permutation for BSC(p1) as pi, then the encoder of
this phase can be expressed as
x
(k)
1:N = ω
(k)
1:N ×GN ,
pi
(
ω
(k)
1:N
)
=
[
s
(k)
1:|R| | U˜
T
k | w
(k)
1:|I| | V˜
T
k | 0
]
,
for every k ∈ {1, . . . , B}, where GN is the polar generator matrix with size N . That is, the
codewords generated from BEC encoding phase are transposed and embedded into the messages
of the BSC encoding process. We denote these codewords by a B×N matrix X . The proposed
encoder is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Decoder for the Main Channel:
The codewords x(k)1:N are transmitted through both the main channel and the wiretap channel.
After receiving the output sequence y(k)1:N for all k ∈ {1, . . . , B}, the task of the decoder at Bob
is to make estimates for all the information and random bits. In particular, the decoder aims to
recover u
(i)
1:|Ac|, v
(j)
1:|A|, w
(k)
1:|I|, r
(i)
1:|A|, and s
(k)
1:|R| successfully with high probability. As that of the
encoding process, the decoding process also works in phases (see Fig. 5).
Phase I (BSC Decoding for the Superior Channel State):
In this phase, using the BSC SC decoder, channels corresponding to the superior state are
decoded. More precisely, since the receiver knows the channel states, it can adopt the correct SC
decoder to obtain estimates ωˆ(k)1:N from y
(k)
1:N for every k corresponding to the superior channel
state. To this end, the decoder adopted in this phase is the classical BSC SC polar decoder with
parameter p1, i.e.,
ωˆ(k)n =


1, if n /∈ F , and W
(n)
1,N (y
(k)
1:N ,ωˆ
(k)
1:n−1|1)
W
(n)
1,N (y
(k)
1:N ,ωˆ
(k)
1:n−1|0)
≥ 1,
0, otherwise,
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(k)
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Fig. 5: Decoder at the main channel receiver given the knowledge of the channel states
information.
in the order n from 1 to N , and W(n)1,N is the n-th polarized channel from BSC(p1). Then, for
every k corresponding to the superior channel state, the decoder can obtain the messages (with
the knowledge of the frozen symbols corresponding to F indices)
pi
(
ωˆ
(k)
1:N
)
=
[
sˆ
(k)
1:|R| |
ˆ˜
UTk | wˆ
(k)
1:|I| |
ˆ˜
V Tk | 0
]
.
However, for the blocks with degraded channel states, one cannot decode reliably because the
frozen bits corresponding to set M2 are unknown at the decoder. At this point, we use the
next phase to decode these frozen bits using a BEC SC decoder. To proceed, we construct a
B × |M2| matrix ˆ˜V T such that its rows corresponding to the superior state are determined in
previous decoding process, while the ones corresponding to the degraded states are all set to
erasures.
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Phase II (BEC Decoding):
In this phase, we decode the frozen bits with respect to the degraded channel state. More
precisely, each row of matrix ˆ˜V , denoted by ˆ˜Vj for j ∈ {1, . . . , |M2|}, is considered as the
input to the decoder, and the receiver aims to obtain an estimate of the information bits from it
using BEC SC decoder. To this end, the decoder adopted in this phase is the classical BEC SC
decoder with parameter q2, i.e.,
νˆ
(j)
b =


1, if b ∈ A, and W
(b)
e,B(
ˆ˜
Vj ,νˆ
(j)
1:b−1|1)
W
(b)
e,B(
ˆ˜
Vj ,νˆ
(j)
1:b−1|1)
≥ 1,
0, otherwise,
in the order b from 1 to B, and W(b)e,B is the b-th polarized channel from BEC(q2). Then, for
every j, the decoder can declare
φ
(
νˆ
(j)
1:B
)
=
[
vˆ
(j)
1:|A| | 0
]
.
At this point, the decoder can reconstruct all erased bits as well. More precisely, the erased rows
in ˆ˜V T can be recovered, and they can be further utilized to decode the information bits in blocks
with the degraded channel state in the next phase.
Phase III (BSC Decoding for the Degraded Channel State):
In this phase, the remaining blocks from Phase I are decoded by using BSC SC decoders with
respect to degraded channel states. In particular, bits in the frozen set for the degraded channel
state (set F and set M2) are known due to the previous phases. Hence, the receiver can decode
from y(k)1:N using BSC SC decoder with parameter p2, i.e.,
ωˆ(k)n =


1, if n /∈ F , n /∈M2, and
W
(n)
2,N (y
(k)
1:N ,ωˆ
(k)
1:n−1|1)
W
(n)
2,N (y
(k)
1:N ,ωˆ
(k)
1:n−1|0)
≥ 1,
ˆ˜
V Tkn, if n ∈M2,
0, otherwise,
in the order n from 1 to N , and W(n)2,N is the n-th polarized channel from BSC(p2). Then, for
every k corresponding to the degraded channel state, the decoder declares
pi
(
ωˆ
(k)
1:N
)
=
[
sˆ
(k)
1:|R| |
ˆ˜
UTk | wˆ
(k)
1:|I| |
ˆ˜
V Tk | 0
]
.
Hence, after this decoding procedure, the receiver makes an estimate ˆ˜U of matrix U˜ , which
further implies all information bits in u(i)1:|Ac| are decoded. Note that, in addition to information
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bits, all random bits are decoded reliably at Bob as well. However, in order to guarantee security,
we set these bits random (instead of information).
Achievable Rate and Reliability:
The proposed hierarchical scheme allows for recovering all information bits (represented by
light blue in Fig. 4) reliably, as long as the designed rates of polar codes do not exceed the
corresponding channel capacities. Hence, the achievable rate is given by
R =
1
NB
(|M2| × |A|+ |M1| × |A
c|+B × |I|)
= [H(p2)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p
∗
1)]× q2 + [H(p
∗
1)−H(p2)]
= [H(p∗1)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]× q2, (10)
where we have used (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8). In this scheme, B number of N-length polar codes
are decoded in Phase I and III in total, and |M2| number of B-length polar codes are decoded
in Phase II. Hence, the decoding error probability is upper bounded by
Pr{M 6= Mˆ|Y1:NB, S} ≤ B · 2−N
β
+ |M2| · 2
−Bβ , (11)
where β < 1/2; and, M is the collection of random variables representing for all information
bits (its realizations include u(i)1:|Ac|, v(j)1:|A|, and w(k)1:|I|), and Mˆ is the estimate of M obtained by
Bob. Noting that the right hand side of (11) tends to 0 when implemented with properly large
B and N , the proposed scheme achieves the upper bound given by (3) reliably.
Security:
Assume that, in addition to z(k)1:N , a genie reveals Eve all information bits u
(i)
1:|Ac|, v
(j)
1:|A|, and
w
(k)
1:|I|. Under this condition, we show that all random bits can be reliably decoded at Eve. More
precisely, the decoder designed for the eavesdropper also works in phases, similar to the one for
the main channel (see Fig. 6).
• Phase I (BSC Decoding for the Superior Channel State): The decoder still works over the
blocks with the superior channel state. However, for the eavesdropper channel with superior
channel state, the frozen set consists of bits not only in set F , but also in sets M2 and I.
Since we have assumed the information bits are known at Eve, the classical BSC(p∗1) SC
decoder can be used to decode the random bits.
• Phase II (BEC Decoding): This phase aims to recover the unknown frozen bits corresponding
to the degraded channel state, where a similar scheme as that of the main receiver is adopted.
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Fig. 6: Decoder at the eavesdropper given the knowledge of the channel states information and
information bits.
More precisely, by modeling the appropriate symbols corresponding to degraded channel
states as erasures, we utilize the BEC(q2) SC decoder over each row of the matrix after
transpose. This scheme successively recovers the erased elements, as the frozen bits for this
BEC is the information bits u(i)1:|Ac| and they are assumed to be known.
• Phase III (BSC Decoding for the Degraded Channel State): Finally, the decoded result from
the previous phase is utilized at the BSC decoding for the degraded state, where the classical
BSC(p∗2) SC decoder is adopted.
By adopting this hierarchical polar decoder, Eve can decode all random bits with high prob-
ability, i.e.,
Pr{R 6= Rˆ|Z1:NB,M, S} ≤ B · 2−N
β
+ |M1| · 2
−Bβ , (12)
where R is the collection of random variables representing for random bits (its realization include
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r
(i)
1:|A| and s
(k)
1:|R|), and Rˆ is the estimate of R. Then, using Fano’s inequality, together with (12),
we have
H(R|Z1:NB,M, S)
≤ [B · 2−N
β
+ |M1| · 2
−Bβ ] · [|R| · B + |A| · |M1|]
+H(B · 2−N
β
+ |M1| · 2
−Bβ). (13)
Based on this, the following steps provide an upper bound (omitting the subscript of Z):
I(M;Z|S) = I(M,R;Z|S)− [H(R|M, S)−H(R|Z,M, S)]
(a)
= I(M,R;Z|S)−H(R) +H(R|Z,M, S)
(b)
≤ NB · CCSI-D(W
∗)−H(R) +H(R|Z,M, S)
(c)
= NB · CCSI-D(W
∗)− |A| · |M1| − B · |R|+H(R|Z,M, S)
(d)
= NB · CCSI-D(W
∗)−Bq1 ·N [H(p
∗
2)−H(p
∗
1)]− B ·N [1−H(p
∗
2)] +H(R|Z,M, S)
= NB · CCSI-D(W
∗)−NB · q1[1−H(p
∗
1)]−NB · q2[1−H(p
∗
2)] +H(R|Z,M, S)
(e)
= H(R|Z,M, S),
where
(a) follows as R is independent of M and S;
(b) is due to the definition of channel W∗’s capacity with CSI-D;
(c) is due to the assumption that R is uniform;
(d) is due to equations (4), (5), and (9);
(e) is due to the ergodic capacity of the degraded fading eavesdropper channel with channel
state information known only at the decoder [17], i.e.,
CCSI-D(W
∗) = q1[1−H(p
∗
1)] + q2[1−H(p
∗
2)].
Finally, combining with (13), we have
1
NB
I(M;Z1:NB|S)→ 0,
as N and B tends to infinity (with proper choice of the their scaling relationship). Hence, the
proposed scheme achieves the secrecy constraint.
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E. The Scenario of p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2
In this section, we extend the aforementioned coding scheme to the scenario of p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤
p2 ≤ p
∗
2. Combined with Theorem 3 provided earlier in this section, this completes the proof for
all possible cases of simultaneous fading and establishes the following result.
Theorem 4. The secrecy capacity for the simultaneous fading model is given by
CsCSI-D = q1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)].
Proof: Note that although p∗1 ≤ p2, the main channel is still stronger than the eavesdropper
channel in each fading block (because of the simultaneous fading assumption). To this end, the
upper bound reported in Lemma 2 still holds for this scenario. It remains to show the achievability
for p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2.
Encoding:
From the previous scenario, the key idea for hierarchical polar coding scheme is setting the size
of random bits be NB ·CCSI-D(W∗) and setting the size of information bits be NB ·CsCSI-D(W).
Based on this observation, the encoder for the scenario discussed here is illustrated in Fig. 7.
Note that we still have five categories for channel indices after polarization. R and F remain
the same as the previous scenario, but we do not have pure information set in this scenario due
to p∗1 ≤ p2. Instead, a new set M3 contains coding results from random bits and frozen bits.
More precisely, parameters shown in the figure are defined as follow:
|R| = N [1−H(p∗2)],
|M1| = N [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)],
|M2| = N [H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)],
|M3| = N [H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)],
|F| = N ·H(p1),
|A| = B · q1,
|Ac| = B · q2.
Then, the encoding procedure works analog to the previous scenario, except that three sets
of BEC encoding are performed and the resulting codewords are transposed and embedded into
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Fig. 7: Encoder for the scenario of p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2.
the second phase. In particular, the sketch of hierarchical coding scheme is described as follow:
Phase I (BEC Encoding):
• Random bits r(i)1:|A| combined with information bits u
(i)
1:|Ac| are encoded to generate u˜
(i)
1:B, for
each i ∈ 1, . . . , |M1|;
• Information bits v(j)1:|A| combined with frozen bits 0 are encoded to generate v˜
(j)
1:B, for each
j ∈ 1, . . . , |M2|;
• Random bits t(l)1:|A| combined with frozen bits 0 are encoded to generate w˜
(l)
1:B, for each
l ∈ 1, . . . , |M3|.
Phase II (BSC Encoding):
Coded bits from Phase I are combined with random bits s(k)1:|R| and frozen bits 0 are encoded
to generate x(k)1:N , for each k ∈ 1, . . . , B.
Decoder for the Main Channel:
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Fig. 8: Decoder at the main channel for the scenario of p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2.
The decoder at the main channel also works in phases. Quite similar to the previous case, the
sketch of decoder is as follows (illustrated in Fig. 8):
• Phase I (BSC Decoding for the Superior State): Decode the block with respect to the superior
state using BSC(p1) SC decoder by choosing frozen bits as 0.
• Phase II (BEC Decoding): Add erasures to the decoded bits in set M3 and M2 from
previous phase, then decode both the random bits and information bits using BEC(q2) SC
decoder by choosing frozen bits as 0.
• Phase III (BSC Decoding for the Degraded State): Recover all bits in set M3 and M2 to
make them the frozen bits, and decode the block with respect to the degraded state using
BSC(p2) SC decoder.
Achievable Rate and Reliability:
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In this way, all information bits and random bits can be recovered reliably, i.e., (11) still holds
in this scenario. Meanwhile, we have
R =
1
NB
(|M2| × |A|+ |M1| × |A
c|)
= [H(p∗1)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]× q2,
which means the upper bound (3) is achieved.
Security:
Assume the receiver from the eavesdropper channel knows all the information bits, i.e., u(i)1:|Ac|
and v(j)1:|A| in this scenario. Then, the decoder (employed at the eavesdropper) can obtain all
random bits by following the steps below (also see Fig. 9):
• Phase I (BSC Decoding for the Superior State): Decode the block with respect to the superior
state using BSC(p∗1) SC decoder by knowing all frozen bits in F and M2.
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• Phase II (BEC Decoding): Add erasures to the decoded bits in set M1 and M3 from
previous phase, then decode both the random bits using BEC(q2) SC decoder by choosing
frozen bits as u(i)1:|Ac| and 0 respectively.
• Phase III (BSC Decoding for the Degraded State): Recover all bits in set M1 and M3 to
make them the frozen bits, and decode the block with respect to the degraded state using
BSC(p∗2) SC decoder.
Hence, all random bits can be decoded reliably, i.e., (12) still holds in this scenario. Then,
the same procedures as the previous scenario complete the proof of security.
IV. HIERARCHICAL POLAR CODING FOR INDEPENDENT FADING CASE
In this section, we focus on the case of independent fading for the main channel and the
eavesdropper channel. More precisely, the main channel has probability q1 to be in the superior
fading state, while the eavesdropper channel has probability q∗1 to be in the superior state
(independent of the main channel). The main hurdle here is that the main and eavesdropper
channels can be in different fading states (e.g., the main channel can be in degraded state while
the eavesdropper channel is in the superior state). Still, as considered in the previous section,
we distinguish two scenarios based on the relation between parameters p∗1 and p2.
A. The Scenario of p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2
In this scenario, for those fading blocks where the main channel is in degraded state and
eavesdropper channel is in superior state, the main channel is still stronger due to p2 ≤ p∗1. To
this end, the upper bound for secrecy capacity can be expressed as follows.
Lemma 5. The secrecy capacity for the independent fading scenario with p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2 is
upper bounded by
CsCSI-D ≤ q
∗
1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2H(p2).
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Fig. 10: Encoder for the scenario of p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2.
Proof: We have the following.
CsCSI-D ≤ C
s
CSI-ED
= max
p(x|s,s∗)
[I(X;Y|S, S∗)− I(X;Z|S, S∗)]
= q1q
∗
1 [H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q1q
∗
2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p1)]
+ q2q
∗
1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p2)] + q2q
∗
2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]
= q∗1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2H(p2), (14)
where random variables S and S∗ are the fading states for the main channel and eavesdropper
respectively; q2 = 1− q1 and q∗2 = 1− q∗1 .
The encoder for this independent fading case is similar to the simultaneous fading case (see
Fig. 10), however, the random bits r(i)1:|A∗| are now of length |A∗|, where set A∗ is the information
set for channel BEC(q∗2), and corresponding decoder at the eavesdropper is SC BEC(q∗2) decoder.
Based on these modifications, all information bits and random bits can still be decoded in this
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scenario, which implies an achievable rate given by
R =
1
NB
(|M2| × |A|+ |M1| × |A
∗c|+ |I| × B)
= [H(p2)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p
∗
1)]× q
∗
2 + [H(p
∗
1)−H(p2)]
= q∗1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2H(p2).
The reliability and security proofs follow from the same steps as the ones detailed for the
simultaneous fading case. This achievable rate matches to the upper bound given by Lemma 5,
establishing the secrecy capacity of the system as reported below.
Theorem 6. The secrecy capacity for the independent fading scenario with p1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p∗2
is given by
CsCSI-D = q
∗
1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2H(p2).
B. The Scenario of p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2
Upper bound on secrecy capacity:
In this scenario, for those fading blocks where the main channel is in degraded state and
eavesdropper channel is in superior state, the eavesdropper channel is stronger. Therefore, the
upper bound for secrecy capacity can be expressed as in the following.
Lemma 7. The secrecy capacity for the independent fading scenario with p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2 is
upper bounded by
CsCSI-D ≤ q1q
∗
1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2q
∗
2H(p2).
Proof: We have
CsCSI-D ≤ C
s
CSI-ED
= max
p(x|s,s∗)
[I(X;Y|S, S∗)− I(X;Z|S, S∗)]
= q1q
∗
1[H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)] + q1q
∗
2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p1)]
+ q2q
∗
10 + q2q
∗
2[H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]
= q1q
∗
1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2q
∗
2H(p2). (15)
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Fig. 11: Encoder for independent fading case with q1 ≥ q∗1
Lower bound on secrecy capacity (for q1 ≥ q∗1):
We focus on the case where superior fading states of the main channel occur more frequently
than the superior states of the eavesdropper channel, i.e., q1 ≥ q∗1 . Under this assumption, we
establish an achievable rate as reported below.
Theorem 8. The secrecy capacity for the independent fading scenario with p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2
and q1 ≥ q∗1 is lower bounded by
CsCSI-D ≥ [H(p
∗
1)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]× q
∗
2 + [H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)]× (q1 − q
∗
1).
Proof:
In the scenario of q1 ≥ q∗1 , the probability of degraded fading state (the underlying erasure
probability in the proposed coding scheme) for the main channel is smaller than that of the
eavesdropper channel. Therefore, the polarized indices for these receivers satisfy A∗ ⊆ A. This
enables us to construct another set of information bits of size (|A| − |A∗|) × |M3| in set M3
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(as shown in Fig. 11). Then, the main channel decoder can decode all information bits, and
eavesdropper, given the information bits, can also decode random bits. We note that the amount
of randomness is equal to the capacity of fading eavesdropper channel, so the analysis detailed
in Section III-D follows here, establishing the proof of security. Hence, the achievable secrecy
rate is
R =
1
NB
[|M2| × |A|+ |M1| × |A
∗c|+ |M3| × (|A| − |A
∗|)]
= [H(p∗1)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]× q
∗
2 + [H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)]× (q1 − q
∗
1).
Remark 9. We note that the technique described above may not be utilized for the case of
q1 < q
∗
1 . In particular, the symbols denoted by M3 in Fig. 11 has to include full randomness
dictated by A∗ to satisfy the secrecy constraint. However, with such a code, the main receiver
may not decode these random bits as A ⊂ A∗.
On the gap between lower and upper bounds (for q1 ≥ q∗1):
We remark that the rate gap between the upper bound in Lemma 7 and the achievable rate
reported in Theorem 8 is given by
∆R = {q1q
∗
1H(p
∗
1) + q
∗
2H(p
∗
2)− q1H(p1)− q2q
∗
2H(p2)}
− {[H(p∗1)−H(p1)]× q1 + [H(p
∗
2)−H(p2)]× q
∗
2 + [H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)]× (q1 − q
∗
1)}
= q∗1q2[H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)] (16)
Noting that we have q1 ≥ q∗1 in this scenario, we can further upper bound the gap as follows.
∆R = q∗1q2[H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)] (17)
(a)
≤ q∗1(1− q
∗
1)[H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)] (18)
(b)
≤ 0.25[H(p2)−H(p
∗
1)] (19)
(c)
, ∆R, (20)
where (a) is due to q1 ≥ q∗1 , implying q2 = 1− q1 ≤ 1− q∗1 , (b) follows as max
x
x(1−x) = 0.25,
and in (c) we define this upper bound on the gap as ∆R.
27
1
0.8
0.6
q1
0.4
0.2
00
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
q1
*
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
1
G
ap
 c
oe
ffi
cie
nt
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
(a)
0.5
0.4
0.3
p1
*
0.2
0.1
00
0.1
0.2
0.3
p2
0.4
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0.5
Up
pe
rb
ou
nd
 o
n 
ga
p 
to
 c
ap
ac
ity
 (b
its
)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
(b)
Fig. 12: Illustration of the gap to capacity. (a) Gap coefficient ∆R
[H(p2)−H(p∗1)]
as a function of the
fading parameters q1 and q∗1 for p1 ≤ p∗1 ≤ p2 ≤ p∗2. (b) Upper bound ∆R on the gap between
achievable rate and capacity. (No gap exists and the capacity is achieved for p2 ≤ p∗1.)
Fig. 12 illustrates the relationships between the upper bound and achievable rate proposed in
Lemma 7 and Theorem 8. In Fig. 12a, we report the gap coefficient ∆R
[H(p2)−H(p∗1)]
as a function
of the fading parameters q1 and q∗1 , the probabilities of superior fading states for main and
eavesdropper channels, respectively. Note that we have 1 ≥ q1 ≥ q∗1 ≥ 0 in this case. In Fig. 12b,
we report the upper bound on the gap given by ∆R as a function of channel parameters p2 and
p∗1. Note that, we have 0.5 ≥ p2 ≥ p∗1 ≥ 0 in this case. The upper bound on the gap is at most
0.25 (bits), as can be seen from the expression of ∆R in (20), increases with p2, and decreases
with p∗1. Here, the gap diminishes as p∗1 ≤ p2 gets closer to p2. The capacity is established
earlier for p∗1 ≥ p2 case, i.e., when main channel fading realization is always stronger than that
of eavesdropper, so we set the corresponding points for gap to zero in the plot. ∆R is equal to
q2q
∗
1 times the difference between the channel capacity for superior eavesdropper channel (i.e.,
1 − H(p∗1)) and that for degraded main channel (i.e., 1 − H(p2)). Thus, this upper bound on
gap to capacity for the proposed scheme linearly scales with the difference of these channel
capacities.
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We remark that the proposed coding scheme pays the penalty of securing information by
exhausting the capacity seen by the eavesdropper. That is, the amount of randomness we utilize
is equal to the fading channel capacity seen by the eavesdropper (according to the marginal
distribution of the channel p(y∗|x)). However, this is not always the case for the upper bound.
For instance, when the eavesdropper channel realization is superior and the main channel is
degraded, as the encoder is assumed to know CSI, no additional penalty is paid to secure the
information for these fading blocks as security can not be achieved. So, while the achievability
assumes no knowledge of instantaneous CSI, the encoder knows and adapts the code according
to eavesdropper CSI for the converse argument. Therefore, the gap we reported here (probably
mostly) reflects the loss due to this CSI knowledge difference.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a hierarchical polar coding scheme is proposed for binary symmetric wiretap
channels with block fading. By exploiting an erasure decoding approach at the receiver, this
scheme utilizes the polarization of degraded binary symmetric channels to survive from the
impact of fading. Meanwhile, to combat with eavesdropping, random bits are injected into the
encoded symbols. We showed that this proposed coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity
when both main and eavesdropper channels experience block fading simultaneously. For the
scenario of independent block fading model, we showed that the capacity is achieved when the
main channel has always a superior fading realization as compared to that of the eavesdropper.
For the remaining case of when eavesdropper’s state can be stronger than the main receiver, a
gap to secrecy capacity is derived using an upper bound derived from a model where the encoder
knows the instantaneous CSI and a lower bound for the special case of when superior fading
state frequency of the main channel is higher than that of the eavesdropper.
Remarkably, for the cases where the proposed coding scheme achieves the secrecy capacity,
there is no loss due to statistical CSI knowledge (as compared to instantaneous CSI knowledge).
For the remaining cases, namely when the eavesdropper channel can see stronger channel state
than that of the main channel, this conclusion remains an open problem, and not only the inner
bound, but also the upper bound we proposed here could be loose. In addition, the case where the
superior fading channel frequency of the eavesdropper channel is greater than that of the main
channel has resisted our efforts thus far. The hierarchical coding scheme proposed here does
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not extend to this case (as the required inclusion of polarized channels is not satisfied for this
scenario), and this case remains as an open problem. We finally note that, although we consider
binary symmetric channels in this paper, the hierarchical coding scheme can be applied as a
general method to other scenarios (such as fading blocks with more states) for simultaneously
resolving fading and security problems. In particular, noting that AWGN channels with BPSK
modulation and demodulation resembles a BSC, the proposed scheme covers a fairly large set
of practically relevant channel models.
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